prospects and effect of the submarine attack* He thought that by 1918 the Allies could not spare the necessary shipping to bring over more than half a million Americans " and maintain them here." He contemplated that by that time we might have been starved into a bad peace. Robertson was a close friend of Jellicoe, and they worked in the most *Harmony* intimate co-operation. Both Jellicoe and *with Jellicoe* Robertson took the German estimate of the probable outcome of the German submarine attack. That is the real significance of Robertson's references to shipping. It may account for his adhesion to the project of a Flanders cam-paign. In this memorandum he is not sanguine about its possibilities, but he regards it almost as a last desperate throw. He can think of no other.

Meanwhile let the Nivelle offensive proceed.

I must add a word as to my own attitude at the time towards this offensive.

At the Rome Conference I tried in vain to dissuade my French colleagues from attempting another great *History of* offensive in France this year and I *my attitude* indicated clearly what the result would *to Nwelle* be. I urged an attack in another quarter, *offensive* Qn the jtaiian Front. When they insisted on the redemption of our Ghantilly bond, I could not withdraw the British signature and risk what might have been a rupture in the Alliance, especially

as all our own military advisers took the French view. When Robertson supported the French thesis at Rome, he was in full possession of the detailed Nivelle modifications of the Chantilly scheme. At that Conference he was one of its most strenuous and stubborn advocates. When the Nivelle operation was the only one left on the board I did my utmost